Several surveys also suggest that boomers intend to work into old age. For example, 68 percent of older workers in one poll said they intended to work in retirement (AARP, 2003) . The mean self-reported probability of working fulltime past age 65 among workers age 51 to 56 participating in the Health and Retirement Study increased from 27 percent in 1992 to 33 percent in 2004 (Mermin, Johnson, and Murphy, 2007) . A MetLife survey found that boomers are increasingly concerned about their ability to afford an early retirement (MetLife Mature Market Institute, 2005) .
Challenges Confronting Older Workers and Employers
Despite these encouraging signs, a number of obstacles remain to lengthening work lives, discouraging both employees from working longer and employers from hiring and retaining them. On the labor supply side, Social Security payroll taxes create disincentives to work at older ages for people who have spent most of their adult lives in the labor force. Social Security benefits are based on average indexed monthly earnings, computed over the 35 years with the highest indexed earnings. For workers with fewer than 35 years of employment, an additional year of work and contributions eliminates a year of zero earnings from the benefit computation, often raising future benefits substantially. But for those with longer employment histories, an additional year of work will raise future Social Security benefits only if current earnings exceed adjusted earnings in the least remunerative of the top 35 years already used in the computation. This gain in benefits is not typically large enough to compensate for the additional payroll taxes that workers must pay (Butrica et al., 2004) .
Even for older workers who have not completed 35 years of qualified work the net increase in Social Security benefits is often small because the benefit formula favors people with low lifetime earnings over those with high lifetime earnings. In addition, workers married to higher-earning spouses often receive no additional Social Security benefits in return for the payroll taxes they pay, because many end up collecting benefits based on their spouse's earnings history. 4 Social Security's retirement earnings test remains in effect for those who have not yet reached the full retirement age, currently 66. The earnings test reduces current benefits for people who have not reached the full retirement age by $1 for every $2 of earnings above a specified annual threshold, set at $14,160 in 2010 (and adjusted each year by the average change in earnings). Many of those whose benefits are taxed away would eventually recover or more than recover them (depending on how long they live) through higher benefits in the future, but many people are unaware of (or do not respond to) this feature of the law. In addition, the earnings test may signal older people that they should not work, discouraging employment more than the financial incentives alone imply.
Certain fringe benefits also discourage work at older ages. As noted earlier, workers in DB pension plans often lose pension wealth if they work beyond the plan's normal retirement age. Although these plans are much less common now than they once were, they continue to cover about one in five workers in the private sector (particularly those in large, unionized firms) and nearly all workers in the public sector (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2009). Retiree health benefits also encourage retirement before age 65 by providing affordable health insurance before Medicare eligibility for people who choose to stop working. Many people without retiree health benefits are forced to work until they qualify for Medicare at age 65 because private nongroup insurance is expensive at older ages, especially for people with health problems. Although these benefits are also disappearing, nearly all public-sector workers and about one in six private-sector workers had access to retiree health benefits from their employers in 2003 (Buchmueller, Johnson, and Lo Sasso, 2006) .
On the demand side, the perceived high costs of older workers may deter employers from hiring and retaining them. For example, wages usually rise with age. If this relationship reflects only age-related productivity gains, then it should not pose employment barriers for older workers. But it may also reflect the workings of internal labor markets that tie pay to seniority regardless of individual productivity. Average health care costs also rise with age, raising the cost of employing older people and often making total compensation rise with age more quickly than productivity.
Medicare secondary payer rules, which designate employer-sponsored health benefits as the primary payer of health care costs for Medicare-covered workers, further raise the cost of workers age 65 and older. DB pension plans raise the cost of hiring and retaining older workers because pension benefits in traditional plans that pay benefits based on highest earning years accrue rapidly in the years immediately before the plan's retirement age.
Older workers may also face age discrimination in the workplace. In a 2005 survey of 800 adults working or looking for work, 36 percent said that employers treated older workers less fairly than younger workers, and 71 percent said that older workers were more likely to be laid off (Reynolds, Ridley, and Van Horn, 2005) . Fully 60 percent of workers age 45 to 74 responding to a 2002 survey said they felt older workers were the first to go when employers cut back their workforces (AARP, 2002) . Two-thirds of the same group of respondents said they believed workers face age discrimination in the workplace, based on what they had experienced or seen. 4 As married women's average lifetime earnings increase relative to men's, however, more married women are receiving benefits based on their own earning histories.
Quasi-experimental evidence provides additional evidence that some employers may favor younger workers over older workers. One study examining how managers reacted to hypothetical workplace situations found that they generally perceived older workers as less flexible and more resistant to change than younger workers and that they were reluctant to promote older workers to jobs requiring flexibility, creativity, and high motivation (Rosen and Jerdee, 1995) . Another study found that employers were less likely to call back older job applicants than otherwise identical younger applicants (Lahey, 2008) . And it takes laid-off workers age 50 and older much longer than younger workers to become reemployed, even though older unemployed workers appear to search just as intensively as their younger counterparts (Johnson and Mommaerts, 2010) .
There is also evidence that some employers are reluctant to invest in training older workers (Frazis, Gittleman, and Joyce, 1998) . Without adequate training, older workers run the risk of having their skills become obsolete, particularly in industries undergoing rapid technological change. Employers may fear that they will be unable to recoup their training costs before older workers retire.
Using Phased Retirement to Promote Workplace Flexibility
Flexible work arrangements are a potential tool that employers can use to retain older workers. They generally appeal to older adults who no longer wish to work traditional full-time schedules, either because of additional personal obligations (such as the need to care for aging parents or spouses or help with grandchildren), worsening health, declining physical energy or stamina, or simply a preference to sacrifice some income for more control over their time without giving up paid employment entirely. Older workers may have accumulated enough savings or gained full or partial access to pension benefits and employer-sponsored health benefits so they can maintain their living standards with lower earnings but still need some labor income. An AARP poll found that 38 percent of older workers want to phase into retirement gradually instead of leave the labor force altogether (AARP, 2005b). These arrangements typically include part-time employment and flexible schedules. They often require changes in work assignments to accommodate new work schedules.
Many younger workers also value flexible work arrangements, which can help maintain work-life balance throughout the lifecourse. Some employers, however, offer these arrangements only to older workers who are transitioning into retirement. These opportunities for phased retirement, which combine flexible work schedules and reduced hours with reduced job responsibilities, can enable employees to extend their careers with the same employer (or at least the same occupation or industry) instead of moving to self-employment or to different occupations or sectors where part-time work schedules are more common (such as retailing). By enabling older workers to stay in the same firm or occupation, these arrangements benefit both workers and their employers. Employees can continue to use the human capital and experience that they have accumulated over a lifetime of work, allowing them to earn more with their existing employers than with different employers. Employers are able to retain the specialized skills and knowledge that their seasoned workers have developed, and avoid the search, hiring, and training costs that result when employees separate.
Phased retirement programs are often difficult to administer, however. They complicate the provision of fringe benefits, especially for employees in DB pension plans. Most older workers cannot afford to reduce their work hours and earnings, particularly before they begin collecting Social Security, unless they can receive employer-sponsored pension benefits. As Sheaks, Pitt-Catsouphes, and Smyer (undated) point out, access to benefits depends on whether phased retirees move directly from full-time work to part-time work or return to the employer after a temporary absence, and whether they are classified as employees or independent contractors or consultants. Uncertainty surrounding legal, regulatory, and tax issues involving employee benefits plans and anti-discrimination protections create additional challenges for employers.
Complications for Pension Plans
Federal law and regulations limit in-service distributions from retirement plans (or retirement payments to employees who are still working for the plan provider). DC retirement plan participants are not allowed to collect plan payments based on their own contributions before leaving the employer, unless they are at least age 59 and one-half.
Until recently federal law forbade DB pension plans from paying benefits to employees before separation unless they had reached the plan's normal retirement age (which varies across plans but is typically 65). The Pension Protection Act of 2006 (PPA) facilitated in-service distributions by allowing plans to pay benefits to active employees beginning at age 62. The Internal Revenue Service issued final phased retirement regulations in May 2007 that effectively ruled out inservice distributions before age 62 for DB plan participants. Because few workers can afford to partially retire unless they receive retirement benefits, these regulations effectively rule out phased retirement before age 59 for DC plan participants and before age 62 for DB plan participants.
Phased retirees in DB pension plans who are not collecting benefits often lose significant pension wealth when they move to part-time employment. Most DB plan benefit formulas tie payments to earnings received near the end of the career, typically average earnings over the last three or five years on the job. DB plan participants would receive retirement benefits based on relatively low earnings if they back on their work hours in the last years of their career.
Instead of phasing from full-time employment to part-time work, retirees could leave the employer and then return part-time. If they return as employees (instead of consultants, say), any DB pension payments they are receiving may be suspended if they work too many hours (such as more than 40 hours in a calendar month). If they return as independent contractors or consultants, they may have to wait several months before returning to their original employer, because tax laws are unclear as to what qualifies as a termination of employment for purposes of receiving pension or retirement benefits. Several large employers, including MITRE and the Aerospace Corporation, rehire retirees who continue to collect pension benefits (Eyster, Johnson, and Toder, 2008) .
Deferred Retirement Option Plans (DROPs).
Deferred retirement option plans (DROPs) are one way of getting around the work disincentive effects of DB plan formulas. Under a DROP, workers who reach retirement age can continue working and receive contributions to a retirement fund equal to the pension benefit they would have received if retired. Workers do not receive cash pension benefits, but the amount contributed to the DROP account accrues interest until they actually retire. Upon retirement, employees start collecting the same annual pension benefit they would have received if they had terminated employment at the retirement age, plus they can withdraw the DROP account funds either as a lump sum or as an actuarially equivalent retirement annuity. In effect, the addition of a DROP makes the DB plan age neutral because the present value of the employee's lifetime retirement benefit does not depend on the retirement date. Additionally, the employee does not receive any cash pension benefits until retirement.
Under some plan designs, DROPs can be used to force out employees, especially if the plan is available only between the earliest retirement age specified in the plan and the normal retirement age (Calhoun and Tepfer, 1998) .
